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FORCED MARRIAGE: TERMINOLOGICAL COHERENCE AND
DISSONANCE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

Valerie Oosterveld•

The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has charged two
accused, Dominic Ongwen and Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz, with forced marriage
as the crime against humanity of other inhumane acts. 1 Ongwen, a former senior
leader and brigade commander in the Lord's Resistance
in northern Uganda,
is charged with directly committing and having responsibility for a system of "forced
exclusive conjugal partners" under which abducted girls and women were compelled
to serve as "wives" within his brigade during the 2002-2005 time period.3 AI Hassan,
the former de facto chief of the Islamic police under armed groups Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb and Ansar Dine, is charged with participating in a policy of forced
marriages which victimized the female inhabitants ofTimbuktu, Mali, in 2012-2013,
and led to repeated rapes and sexual enslavement of these women and girls.4 These
charges broke new ground for the ICC, which had never before laid charges explicitly focused on forced marriage. s
These charges build upon developments at two other international(ized) criminal
tribunals: the Special Court for Sierra Leone (the "Special Court" or SCSL) and the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC).6 The Special Court
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1
Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges against Dominic Ongwen (Pre-Trial Chamber li Mar. 23, 2016) [hereinafter Ongwen
ConfrrmationofCharges]; Prosecutorv. AI Hassan, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/18, Warrant of
Arrest for AI Hassan Ag Abdou! Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud (Pre-Trial Chamber I
Mar. 27, 2018) [hereinafter A1 Hassan Arrest Warrant].
2
Ongwen Confirmation of Charges, supra note 1, ~ I.
3
Id 1Mf104--17, 136--38.
4
A1 Hassan Arrest Warrant, supra note 1, 1M[ 5-7, 9, 12.
' The ICC had, however, considered evidence offorced marriage under the charge of
sexual slavery. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ~ 431 (Pre-Trial Chamber I Sept. 30, 2008).
6
The Special Cowt for Sierra Leone is considered to be an "international" criminal tribunal.
See Prosecutorv. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14/15/16-AR72(E), Decision on Constitutionality and Lack of Jurisdiction, 1Mf49-52 (Appeals Chamber Mar. 13, 2004) (explaining that
the Special Cowt "is established outside the national court system" and "is not anchored in any
existing system''); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity
from Jurisdiction, 1Mf37-42 (Appeals Chamber May 31, 2004) ("[T]he Special Court was
established to fulfil an international mandate and is part ofthe machinery of international
justice.''). The Special Court was provided with international legal personality. See Agreement
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was the flrst international court to enter convictions of forced marriage as a type of
crime against humanity.7 In its judgments, the Special Court concluded that, during
the armed conflict in Sierra Leone in the 1990s, a large number of civilian women
and girls were forced to serve as so-called "bush wives" to rebel forces within a
widespread and organized system of slavery. 8 These girls and women were expected
to submit to rape as demanded by their "husbands," do domestic chores, porter their
husband's belongings, and bear and rear any children conceived from their rapes.9
The Special Court convicted leaders of a rebel group for their participation in a joint
criminal enterprise which supported this system of forced marriage. 10
Following the example set by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the ECCC also
convicted individuals for their participation in a joint criminal enterprise which
carried out a nationwide policy of forced marriage. 11 The ECCC found that, during
the 1975-1979 reign of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, men and women-often
strangers--were forced to marry as part of the ruling party's attempts to implement
the "great leap forward" in the regime's socialist revolution. 12 The forcibly married
individuals were pressured to have sex and produce children. 13
between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a
SpecialCourtforSierraLeoneart.ll(d),Jan.16,2002, 2178U.N.T.S. 138 (granting the Special
Court the ''judicial capacity necessary to" "[e]nter into agreements with States as may be
necessary for the exercise of its functions and for the operation of the Court') (entered into
force Apr. 12, 2002). The ECCC refers to itselfas an ''internationalized" criminal tribunal because it is a "Cambodian court with international elements." Is the ECCC a Cambodian or an
International Court?, Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia (July 20, 2017),
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/faq/eccc-cambodian-or-international-court [https://perma.cc/XM
9M-H5NW].
7
Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone Office ofthe Prosecutor, Special Court
Prosecutor Hails RUFConvictions (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Press
/OlP/prosecutor-022509. pdf [hereinafter RUF Trial Judgment Press Release]; Press Release,
Special Court for Sierra Leone Office of the Prosecutor, Prosecutor Welcomes Convictions
inRUFAppeals Judgment(Oct 26, 2009), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Press/OTP/prose
cutor-102609.pdf [hereinafter RUF Appeals Judgment Press Release].
8
Prosecutorv. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T,Judgm.ent,, 1295 (Tria1Chamber1Mar.2,
2009) [hereinafter RUF Trial Judgment]. See also SUSAN MCKAY & DYAN MAzuRANA,
WHERE ARE 1HE GIRLS? GIRLS IN FIGHTING FORCES INNORTIIERN UGANDA, SIERRA LEONE
AND MOZAMBIQUE: 1lmiR. LIVES DuRING AND AFrnR. WAR 92 (2004) (reporting that sixty
percent of girl soldiers interviewed indicated that they had served as ''wives" to the Revolutionary United Front combatants, or other fighting forces).
9
RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 8, 'rn 460, 1154-55, 1211-13, 1293, 1295, 1413,
1472.
10
Id at 678, 682, 685.
11
Prosecutor v. Nuon (Case 002/02), Case No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC!fC, Summary of
Judgment in Case 002/02,,39, 51, 60 (Trial Chamber Nov. 16, 2018) [hereinafter Summary
of Judgment in Case 002/02].
12
Id , 5-6, 39--40.
13
Id , 39--40.
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Interestingly, each tribunal has defined and understood forced marriage in a somewhat different manner. 14 Indeed, even within a tribunal, interpretations of forced
marriage vmy. 15 This Article examines the variances in perceptions offorced marriage
as the crime against humanity of"other inhumane acts." It begins by describing how
the first international criminal tribunal to consider forced marriage--the Special Court
for Sierra Leone--approached the violation. 16 It further analyzes the Special Court's
changing categorization of forced marriage. 17 The Article then explores how the
ECCC followed the Special Court's lead, but also incorporated more direct reference
to international human rights law's approach to forced marriage. 18 Finally, it recounts
how the ICC has--to some extent-bridged the differences between the vmying interpretations by bringing together the international criminal law definition of forced
marriage set out by the Special Court's Appeals Chamber with aspects of international
human rights law's understanding of rights related to marriage. 19
This Article concludes, however, that the debate raised by these tribunals' differing approaches to forced marriage is not settled. While there is momentum around
one definition-ofthat proffered by the Special Court's Appeals Chamber-it leaves
the question raised by the Special Court's Taylor Trial Chamber unanswered: should
the international criminal law community abandon the forced marriage terminology in
favor of another label?20

I. FORCED MARRIAGE AND 1RE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
The Prosecutor ofthe Special Court for Sierra Leone brought charges for forced
marriage as the crime against humanity of "other inhumane acts" in two cases:
14

See A1 Hassan Arrest Warrant, supra note 1; RUF Trial Judgment Press Release, supra
note 7; RUF Appeals Judgment Press Release, supra note 7.
1
' See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Defence Motion
for Judgment ofAcquittal Pursuant to Rule 98, Separate Concurring Opinionofthe Hon. Justice
Julia Sebutinde,, 14 (Trial Chamber Mar. 31, 2006) [hereinafter AFRC Decision on Motion
for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98] (stating that ''the acts of'forced marriage' that
occurred within the context ofthe Sierra Leonean conflict, are in fact a form ofsexual violence
pursuant to Article 2.g. ofthe Statute and could equally quality as a form of sexual slavery
pursuant to Article 2.g. ofthe Statute," but that she is ''not persuaded that the acts of'forced
marriage' ... can be properly charged under the general regime of 'other inhumane acts'
pursuant to Article 2.i. of the Statute'').
16
See infra Part I.
17
See infra Part I. Compare Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment,
, 713 (Trial Chamber II June 20, 2007) [hereinafter AFRC Trial Judgment], with Prosecutor
v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, Judgment, 1 195 (Appeals Chamber Feb. 22, 2008)
[hereinafter AFRC Appeals Judgment].
18
See infra Part2; see also, e.g., Prosecutorv. Nuon, Case No. 002119-09-2007-ECCCOCIJ, Closing Order,, 1432, 1442-46(Sept.l5,2010) [hereinafterECCCClosingOrder].
19
See infra Part ill; see also, e.g., Ongwen Confirmation of Charges, supra note 1,
, 88-93.
20
See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment,, 424-27,430 (Trial
Chamber II May 18, 2012) [hereinafter Taylor Trial Judgment].
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Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kantl 1 (referred to as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or AFRC case), and Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbaifl (referred
to as the Revolutionary United Front or RUF case). 23 The trial judges of the Special
Court also considered evidence of forced marriage in the case ofProsecutor v. Taylor
in support of charges of sexual slavery and other forms of enslavement. 24 The Special Court's Statute does not include a specifically enumerated violation called "forced
marriage," which is why the charges were considered under the "other inhumane
acts" category. 25
The judges in the AFRC trial were the first to consider the violation of forced
marriage, which had never before been litigated at an international criminal tribunal. 26
Given the lack of precedent, the judges had to identify the contours of the violation,
which revealed their differing interpretations of the term as applied to the armed
conflict in Sierra Leone.27
The violation of forced marriage was not present in the original AFRC indictment, but was added to the section titled "Sexual Violence" as a result of a later
request by the Prosecutor. 28 In agreeing to the Prosecutor's request, the Trial Chamber concluded that forced marriage was a "kindred offence" to the already-charged
offenses of rape and sexual slavery.29 This was an early indication that at least some
of the judges equated forced marriage with sexual offenses, rather than viewing
forced marriage as a gendered offense containing both sexual and non-sexual
elements (such as forced domestic labor and portering). 30 This focus on the sexual
Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Further Amended Consolidated Indictment,~ 51-57
(Feb. 18, 2005).
22
Case No. SCSL-04-15-PT, Corrected Amended Consolidated Indictment,~ 60 (Aug. 2,
2006).
23
The Prosecutor requested the addition offorced marriage charges to a third case involving
leaders ofthe Civil Defence Forces, but was denied See Prosecutorv. Norman, Case No. SCSL04-14-PT, Decision on Prosecution Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment(Trial Chamber
May 20, 2004). For critiques ofthis decision and an explanation ofthe events that followed, see
Michelle S. Kelsall & Shanee Stepakoff, 'When We Wanted to Talk About Rape': Silencing
Sexual Violence at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 1 INT'L J. TRANsmoNAL JusT. 355
(2007); Valerie Oosterveld, The Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, Child Soldiers, and Forced
Ma"iage: Providing Clarity or Confusion?, 45 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 131, 159--68 (2007).
24
Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 20, ~ 422, 424--30, 1101, 1700.
25
See AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 17, ~ 701 (summarizing the Prosecutor's explanation).
26
See id.
27
Id. ~ 701, 713-14.
28
Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, Decision on Prosecution Request for
Leave to Amend the Indictment,~ 58 (Trial Chamber May 6, 2004) [hereinafter AFRC
Motion to Amend Indictment].
29
Id. ~51-52.
3
For more detail, see Valerie Oosterveld, Forced Marriage and the Special Court for
Sie"a Leone: Legal Advances and Conceptual Difficulties, 2 J.lNT'L & HUMANITARIAN
LEGALS1UD. 127, 131 (2011).
21

°
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aspects was confirmed by one of the judges midway through the 1rial.31 At that time,
Justice Sebutinde indicated that ''the sexual element inherent in these acts [of forced
marriage] tends to dominate the other elements therein" and therefore, in her view,
the forced marriage evidence was already covered by the sexual slavery charge. 32
The Prosecutor argued against this notion, distinguishing forced marriage from sexual
slavery based on the status of"wife" conferred by the AFRC on its victims. 33 In the
Prosecutor's view, the victims of forced marriage suffered from banns that can be
distinguished from those of sexual slavery: ''first, the non-consensual conferral ofthe
status of'marriage' and the resulting long-lasting physical and psychological damage,
as well as societal stigmatization, and, second, the harms caused by the consequent
forced duties associated with being a 'wife. '"34 The Prosecutor seemed to have used
the term "marriage" not in its strict legal sense as defined in international human rights
law, but as a term meant to capture a corrupted version ofpre-war peacetime marriages
in Sierra Leone, in which women and girls were largely treated as subordinate to men.35
Justice Sebutinde revived her view in the final trial judgment, which was also
adopted by a second judge. 36 As the majority, the judges dismissed the forced marriage charges on the grounds that they were redundant and "completely subsumed"
by the sexual slavery charges. 37 The majority judges did not accept the Prosecutor's
conceptualization of harms, nor that there was any evidence of these harms:
Not one of the victims of sexual slavery gave evidence that the
mere fact that a rebel had declared her to be his wife had caused
her any particular trauma, whether physical or mental. Moreover, in the opinion of the Trial Chamber, had there been such
evidence, it would not by itselfhave amounted to a crime against
humanity, since it would not have been of similar gravity to the
[other crimes against humanity listed in the Statute of the Special Court for SierraLeone]. 38
31

See AFRC Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98, supra

note 15.
32

Id. ~ 16.

33

AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 17,, 701.
Oosterveld, supra note 30, at 132.
I d. at 133. See Karine Belair, Unearthing the Customary Law Foundations of"Forced

34
35

Marriages" During Sierra Leone's Civil War: The Possible Impact oflnternational Criminal
Law on Customary Marriage and Women's Rights in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone, 15 COLUM.
J. GENDER& L. 551, 567-77 (2006). The Special Court's Prosecutor referred to this as ''forced
conjugal association" and a ''veneer" ofmarriage on appeal. AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra
note 17,, 189.
36
AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 17, W2116, 2120, 2123.
37
/d.~ 713-14.
38
/d. , 710. This assertion has been criticized. See, e.g., Neha Jain, Forced Marriage as
a Crime Against Humanity: Problems ofDefinition and Prosecution, 6 J. INT'LCRIM:. JUST.
1013, 1018 (2008).
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Ultimately, this assertion signals that the majority judges approached forced
marriage in a very different manner than the Prosecutor. In particular, while the
Prosecutor used the term "marriage" in a metaphorical sense to cover a scenario of
sexual and domestic slavery, the majority judges used it in a literal sense, defining
''marriage" as "establishing mutual obligations inherent in a husband[-]wife relationship." 39 This view ofmmriage, which is reflective ofthat found in international human
rights law,40 was contrasted with the term ''wife." The majority judges concluded
that the victims did not consider themselves to be married, but rather that the term
''wife" was imposed on the victims as the rebels' label for sexual slavery. 41
The dissenting judge, Justice Doherty, did not support this llU\iority view.42 Taking
a position similar to that of the Prosecutor, she categorized the ''marriage" in Sierra
Leonean-wartime-forced-marriage as something distinct within international criminal
law.43 She defined the violation as "the imposition, by threat or physical force arising
from the perpetrator's words or other conduct, of a forced conjugal association by
the perpetrator over the victim.'744 This "forced conjugal association" was not the
same as marriage under international human rights law (or under traditional Sierra
Leonean law); while it echoed international human rights law in focusing on nonconsent, the ''marriage" portion referred instead to a form of"ownership by a particular
rebel.'>45 She pointed out that the line between this international criminal law version
of wartime "wife" and peacetime understandings of "wife" in Sierra Leone become
somewhat blurred when one considers the post-war context: some of the victims
remained with their "husbands" after the war because they could not find an alternative
to this situation, they accepted their lot in life, they were rejected by their families
and communities, or they felt an obligation to rear the children born during the forced
maniage. 46 However, she added that the decision to remain in the forced marriage
does not negate the original criminality of the act.47
39

AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 17,1711.
It is reflective of international human rights law in terms of implying freely given
consent and obligations attached to that consent. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N.
Doc. N6316 (1966); 999 U.N. T.S. 171; 6 ILM 368 (1967) (entry into force Mar. 23, 1976),
art. 23(3}-{4).
41
AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 17, 1 712.
42
Id; Partly Dissenting Opinion ofJustice Doherty on Count 7 (Sexual Slavery) and Count
8 ('Forced Marriages'), 11 14-15.
43
Id 11 53, 58-71.
44
Id 153.
45
Id 11 36, 46, 53, 63-65, 69, 71.
46
Id 1 45. This is consistent with other observations ofthe continuum of gender-based
violence and discrimination before, during, and after war. See, e.g., FIONNUALA N. AoLAIN,
40

DINA F. HAYNES & NAOMI CAHN, ON THE FRONTLINES: GENDER, WAR, AND THE PosrCONFLICTPROCESS 36--39 (2011).
47
AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 17, at Doherty Dissent, '11 45.
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Justice Doherty also concluded that forced marriage was a type ofviolation with
important aspects that differentiated it from sexual slavery, and thus forced marriage
could not be entirely subsumed within the sexual slavery charges. 48 She found that
forced marriage differs from sexual slavery because it "is concerned with the mental
and physical trauma of being forced unwillingly into a marital arrangement, the
stigma associated with being labeled a rebel 'wife' and the corresponding rejection
by the community.' 149
Justice Doherty additionally rejected the majority's conclusion that there was
no evidence that the status of''wife" caused trauma to victims: "I find the label of'wife'
to a rebel caused mental trauma, stigmatised the victims and negatively impacted
their ability to reintegrate into their communities."50 In particular, the victims' mental
trauma included being "forced to associate with and in some cases live together with
men whom they may fear or despise."51
On appeal, the Appeals Chamber rejected the majority judges' view that forced
marriage was the same as sexual slavery. 52 Using strong language, it stated: ''the
Appeals Chamber finds that no tribunal could reasonably have found that forced
marriage was subsumed in the crime against humanity of sexual slavery."53 This is
because forced marriage may be distinguished from sexual slavery in two ways:
First, forced marriage involves a perpetrator compelling a person
by force or threat of force ... into a conjugal association with
another person resulting in great suffering, or serious physical or
mental injury on the part of the victim. Second, unlike sexual
slavery, forced marriage implies a relationship of exclusivity between the ''husband" and ''wife," which could lead to disciplinary
consequences for breach of this exclusive arrangement. 54
The Appeals Chamber contrasted this with exercises of power attaching to the
right ofownership required in sexual slavery.55 The Appeals Chamber also identified
a number of harms associated with forced marriage that may further differentiate it
from sexual slavery, including injuries to victims from the imposition of the label
''wife," social ostracization, forced domestic labor such as cooking and cleaning,
forced reproductive work such as forced pregnancy and forced child-rearing, forced
sexual exclusivity, and serious punishment for failure to carry out these tasks.5 6 It
48

Id 1[14, 50.
Id. 1[42.
so Id. 1[51.
51
Id 1[48.
52
AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra note 17, 1[195.
53 Id.

49

54

Id

55

See id. 1[190.
Id.
190-93, 199-2oo.

56

mr
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pointed out that the "husbands" in the Sierra Leonean wartime forced marriages were
expected to provide food, clothing, and protection to their "wives," including protection
from rape by other men, acts they would not necessarily perform for sexual slaves. 57
Echoing Justice Doherty's approach, the Appeals Chamber concluded that forced
marriage can be defined as:
[A] situation in which the perpetrator[.] through his words or conduct, or those of someone for whose actions he is responsible,
compels a person by force, threat of force, or coercion to serve as
a conjugal partner resulting in severe suffering, or physical, mental or psychological injury to the victim. 51
In this definition, the Appeals Chamber appears to have accepted that the term "forced
marriage" does not need to refer to legal marriage identified under international
human rights law. 59 Instead, it assumes that a "marriage-like" scenario--albeit one
with massive differences in power between the ''wife" and the "husband"-taking
place during an armed conflict suffices to satisfy the term.60 Ultimately, the Appeals
Chamber did not enter fresh convictions for forced marriage, relying instead on the
expressive nature of its conclusion that forced marriage is criminal in nature. 61
The consideration of forced marriage by the Trial and Appeals Chambers in the
AFRC case set the stage for further consideration in Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and
Gbao. 62 In that case, the Trial Chamber avoided the debates that underlay the AFRC
case over how "marriage" should be construed.63 Rather, the RUF Trial Chamber focused on the question ofwhether the collection of acts termed "forced marriage" in the
Sierra Leone context satisfied the elements ofthe crime against humanity of"other inhumane acts.•o64 It considered evidence of: the capture or abduction ofgirls and women
by RUF forces; their subsequent assignment as ''wives" ofRUF fighters; their expected
loyalty to their "husbands"; the expectation that these ''wives" would submit to sex on
demand from their "husbands" and maintain this exclusive sexual relationship; forced
domestic labor and portering by the ''wives"; forced childbearing and child-rearing;
57

58

59

Id 1[190.
Id 1[196.
See id mr 184-85, 194-95.

~ 0 The Appeals Chamber discusses the difference between traditional arranged marriages,

marriage as set out in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW), and wartime forced marriage in Sierra Leone. Id 1[194.
~ 1 Id 1[202.
u See RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 8, mf 1178, 1211.
~ 3 See id mf 165--67.
64
See id 1[ 168. This approach was affirmed on appeal (though the Appeals Chamber also
reiterated its definition offorced marriage set out in the AFRC Appeals Judgment). Prosecutor
v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-A, Judgment, mf 735-36 (Appeals Chamber Oct. 26, 2009)
[hereinafter RUF Appeals Judgment].
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fear by the "wives" of violent retribution for failing in any ofthe expected responsibilities; and long-lasting societal stigma for having been labeled an RUF "wife."65
Instead of focusing on "marriage," the Trial Chamber focused on the word
''wife." The Trial Chamber found that ''the use of the term 'wife' by the rebels was
deliberate and strategic, with the aim of enslaving and psychologically manipulating
the women and with the purpose of treating them like possessions. •o66 The Trial
Chamber concluded that forced marriage played an important role in effectively
disempowering and instilling fear within the civilian population, isolating the victims
and destroying family nuclei, and undermining Sierra Leonean society. 67 It convicted
the accused, resulting in the frrst international criminal convictions for forced marriage in armed conflict. 68
Ultimately, the Trial Chamber seems to have adopted an approach which is
specific to international criminal law.69 Under this approach, the international human
rights law definition of consensual, legal marriage is not at issue. Rather, the focus
is on the term ''wife" and a collection of non-consensual hanns termed "forced marriage" that qualify as the crime against humanity of"other inhumane acts."
The Special Court for Sierra Leone considered forced marriage in a third and flna1
case: that ofthe former President ofLiberia, Charles Taylor. 70 While Taylor was not
charged with forced marriage as the crime against humanity of"other inhumane acts,"
evidence offorced marriage was used to support other charges, including those of sexual slavery. 71 The Taylor Trial Chamber-which contained the same judges as the
AFRC Trial Chamber-used the opportunity to opine on the term ''forced marriage. " 72
Recall that the llliYority judges in the AFRC Trial Chamber focused on the ''marriage"
aspect of the term, defining marriage in a manner reflective of international human
rights law.73
In the Taylor judgment, the Trial Chamber returned to this theme, finding that the
term ''forced marriage" is a ''misnomer" because there was ''not marriage in the universally understood sense of a consensual and sacrosanct union."74 Thus, the Trial
Chamber felt that it was "inappropriate to refer to the perpetrators as 'husbands. "'75
6
' RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 8, mf 1154-55, 1211-13, 1293, 1295-96, 1412-13,
1466--72.
66
Id. ~ 1466.
67
Id.
1348-49.
68
RUF Trial Judgment Press Release, supra note 7; RUF Appeals Judgment Press Release,
supra note 7.
69
See RUF Trial Judgment Press Release, supra note 7,, 1466.
70
See Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 20, , 8.
71
Id.
422, 1101, 11oo.
72
Id.
424-26, 429.
73
See AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 17, mf 701, 703--Q5; supra notes 39-41 and
accompanying text.
74
Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 20, mf 425, 427.
7
' Id. ~ 426.
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This view reflected the views of some commentators, who had expressed concerns
that no actual marriage had occurred in the Sierra Leone scenario. 76 Rather, the Trial
Chamber redefined the acts previously described as forced marriage by the Special
Court as "conjugal slavery.'m Conjugal slavery, according to the Taylor trial judges,
was simply the combination ofsexual slavery and enslavement through forced domestic
labor. 78 The Trial Chamber stressed that conjugal slavery is not a new crime, but is
a term encompassing two forms of slavery.79 In recharacterizing forced marriage as
conjugal slavery, the Trial Chamber attempted to redirect the discussion away from
whether or not legal or other forms of marriage are required for the violation.
Despite the lack ofuniformity in the manner in which the AFRC, RUF, and Taylor
judgments approached forced marriage, the Special Court's jurisprudence has influenced discussions of forced marriage by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of
Cambodia and the International Criminal Court. This Article therefore turns next to
an examination of how the ECCC has interpreted forced marriage as a violation of
international criminal law.

II. THE ExTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF
CAMBODIA AND FORCED MARRIAGE

The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia were created to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed during the
1975-1979 Khmer Rouge regime.8 Forced marriage was not initially investigated
by the ECCC due to incorrect but widely held assumptions that the Khmer Rouge
regime was largely devoid of sexual or gender-based violence, but later launched an
investigation at the prompting of the civil parties. 81 Forced marriage was therefore

°

76

SeeJenniferGong-Gershowitz,ForcedMarriage: A "New" CrimeAgainstHumanity?,

8 NW. J.INT'L HUM. RTS. 53, 65--66 (2009); Patricia V. SeUers, Wartime Female Slavery:
Enslavement?, 44 CORNEU..INT'LL. J. 115, 130 n.97, 137, 142 (2011).
77
Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 20,, 428. Note that the issue ofconjugal slavery versus
forced marriage was not addressed by the Appeals Chamber.
78
Jd., 430.
19
I d. Note, however, some confusing language at, 429:"[I]he Trial Chamber considers
that conjugal slavery is better conceptualized as a distinctive form ofthe crime ofsexual slavery,
with the additional component described by the Appeals Chamber." The actual practice of
the Trial Chamber, however, was to consider the forced marriage evidence under both the
sexual slavecy and enslavement (forced labor) charges, as explained in, 427-28, 430.
80
Law on the Establishment ofExtraordinacy Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for
the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (200 1)
(Cambodia), as amended by NSIRKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004), https://www.eccc.gov.kh
/sites/default/files/legal-documents/KR_ Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf[https://
perma.cc/KM6E-QYHS] [hereinafter ECCC Governing Law].
11
See Prosecutorv. Nuon, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCCOCIJ, Order on Request for Investigative Action Concerning Forced Marriages and Forced Sexual Relations (Dec. 18, 2009)
[hereinafter ECCC Investigative Order on Forced Marriage]; Prosecutor v. Nuon, Case No.
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considered in the Closing Order for Case 002, as well as in the second judgment in
that case. 82
The Closing Order for Case 002, issued in September 2010, described how forced
marriage was one ofthe five policies implemented by the Communist Party ofKampuchea to implement the "great leap forward" within Cambodia's socialist revolution. 83
The Communist Party regulated marriage to control sexual interactions between men
and women and simultaneously to reconstruct the meaning ofmarriage in the country. 84
The Communist Party organized mass weddings ofmen and women who were forcibly
married to each other in public buildings or public places.85 The men and women usually did not know each other prior to the weddings.86 If they refused to marry, they
could be executed. 87 The forcibly married couples were expected to rapidly consummate their marriages, and thus, were often under surveillance. 88 The goal of the forced
marriages was to quickly increase the population of desirable citizens through births. 89
In other words, forced marriage was used to control sexual relations within the
Cambodian population in order to socially engineer the future population through
forced procreation. 90
The Closing Order charged forced marriage under the crimes against humanity of
rape and "other inhumane acts.'>91 The use ofthe "other inhumane acts" category was
influenced by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 92 The actus reus was defined as ''victims endured serious physical or mental suffering or injury," including sexual violence,
002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, Supplementary Submission (Apr. 30, 2009); Silke Studzinsky,
Victims ofSexual andGender-Based Crimes Before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Caurts
ofCambodia: Challenges ofRights to Participation and Protection, in SEXUAL VIOLENCE

AS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES 173, 179 {Anne-Marie de
Brouwer et al. eds., 2013).
82
ECCC Closing Order, supra note 18, ~ 156--57.
83 Id
14
Id ~ 216--17.
8
' Id ~ 220, 842, 844. These weddings ranged anywhere from two to over 100 couples.
Id ~ 844.
86
Id ~ 849.
87
Id ~ 849-50.
88
Id ~ 220,314, 858, 1432.
89
See id ~ 1447.
90
See ROCHEllE BRAAF, SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST ETIINIC MINORITIES DURING THE
KHMERRouGEREGIME24-31 (2014) (for a victim-focused study on the state control inherent
in these forced marriages).
91
ECCC Closing Order, supra note 18, ~ 1432, 1442-46. This Closing Order, in which
forced marriage is discussed at length, was issued in 2010. This was prior to the Special Cowt' s
2012 trial judgment in Taylor, in which the Trial Chamber expressed the view that forced marriage was actually conjugal slavery consisting of forced labor plus sexual slavery. See Taylor
Trial Judgment, supra note 20. Note also that the ECCC's governing law does not list sexual
slavery as a crime. See ECCC Governing Law, supra note 80.
92
See ECCC Investigative Order on Forced Marriage, supra note 81,, 11.
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and ''were forced to enter into conjugal relationships in coercive circumstances.'>93
The mens rea was that ''the perpetrators knew of the factual circumstances that established the gravity of their acts.'794
The Co-Prosecutors' Closing Brief, filed at the end of the second trial in Case
002, sets forth a more detailed understanding of forced marriage under the Khmer
Rouge, bringing together both international criminal and human rights law.95 The
Closing Brief highlighted three main aspects of the centralized forced marriage
policy of the Communist Party ofKampuchea.
First, it contrasted forced marriages under the Khmer Rouge regime with two
types of "consent from the bride and groom" and their families--consent to spousal
selection and consent to the marriage itself-that traditionally underpinned marriage
in Cambodian society prior to the regime. 96 It did so while highlighting the ''rich tradition" and "sacred rituals" that accompanied the decision by spouses and their families
to get married in pre-Khmer Rouge Cambodia. 97 They also invoked the role of law
and ceremony in these weddings. 91 In comparison, marriages under the Khmer Rouge
"lacked consent from one or both spouses.'>99 The Communist Party of Kampuchea
''removed the right of Cambodian people to marry freely to their partner of choice"
and decided ''whether, when, and whom couples would marry."100 In this manner,
the Co-Prosecutors were alluding to international human rights law's focus on freely
given spousal consent and selection. 101
Second, the Co-Prosecutors focused on the consequence ofthe forced marriage:
forced consummation through rape. 102 The Communist Party of Kampuchea "felt
entitled to take absolute control over 'family building' and sexual life," which were
expected to be sacrificed in order to build ''revolutionary families" to serve the state
ideology. 103 As a result, "[c ]lose monitoring of the new couples [to ensure that they
had sex] was, therefore, typically organised immediately after the weddings. " 104 The
93

ECCC Closing Order, supra note 18,, 1443.
Id. , 1444.
95
Prosecutorv. Nuon, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/fC, Co-Prosecutors' Closing Brief:
, 585--86 (Trial Chamber May 2, 20 17) [hereinafter ECCC Co-Prosecutors' Closing Brief].
This Closing Briefdiscusses the central Communist Party ofKampuchea policy around pairings, organization and notification ofmarriages, and the monitoring ofconsummation, carried
out in a similar, organized fashion.
96
Id., 583.
97 Id.
98
See ki., 611.
99
Id., 585. See also, 611-13.
100
Id. , 593, 599.
101
See id. at 361 n.240 1 (referring to a violation ofArticle 16 ofthe Universal Declaration
of Human Rights on the right to marriage and family).
102
See id. , 585-86.
103
Id. , 587--88.
104 Id. , 598.
94

2019]

FORCED MARRIAGE

1275

result was that "sexual intercourse took place without the consent of either one or
both participants in the sexual act and constituted rape. " 105
Third, the Co-Prosecutors highlighted the "clinical[] execut[ion]" ofthe Communist Party of Kampuchea's forced marriage policy. 106 Every aspect of forced
marriage under the Khmer Rouge was regulated. 107 Authorities were directed to
create male-female couples based on "identical political class, ethnicity, and background."108 The marriages were tracked and reports were sent up the hierarchy to the
Party Centre. 109 Tens of thousands of men and women were forced into marriage
under the Khmer Rouge, mostly with little to no advance notice. 110 "Many had never
met their spouse before the ceremony and some were unable to recognise him or her
afterwards." 111 The spouses were not permitted to object; the consequences could be
severe. 112 The circumstances ofthe forced marriages left many ofthe victims deeply
upset and suffering from physical and mental trauma. 113
In setting out their view ofthe applicable law, the Co-Prosecutors referred both
to international human rights law and international criminallaw. 114 They begin by
noting that"[t]he right to be free of a coerced marriage is so fundamental that it was
recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" in 1948, and numerous
subsequent international instruments. 115 They then proposed a definition of forced
marriage based on the Special Court for Sierra Leone Appeals Chamber's approach:
"[F]orced marriage occurs when the perpetrator compels a person by force, threat
of force, or coercion to serve as a conjugal partner."116 The Co-Prosecutors then
focused on lack of consent as defined in international criminal law to argue that a
coercive environment, such as that created by the Khmer Rouge, vitiates consent. 117
In other words, the Co-Prosecutors proposed that, while international human rights
law informs the understanding of forced marriage as lacking consent, international
criminal law explains the contexts in which lack of consent is inherent. 118
105

Id 1[615.
See id 1[587.
107
See id 1[599.
108
Id 1[600.
1o9 Id
110
Id 1[601.
m Id
112
See id mf 603--04.
113
Id mr 601, 620-27.
114
See id mf 119-20 (referring to statutes ofvarious ad hoc international tribunals, including
the ICTY, ICTR, and ECCC).
m Id 1[188 (referring to the 1964 Convention on Consent to Marriage, Article 23(3) ofthe
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Articles 8 and 12 ofthe European
Convention on Human Rights).
116
ECCC Co-Prosecutors' Closing Brie±: supra note 95, 1[ 189 (citing AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra note 17, 1[ 196 and RUF Appeals Judgment, supra note 64, mf 735-36).
117
See id. 1[190.
118
See id
106
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The ECCC's Trial Chamber issued its second judgment in Case 002 in November 20 18. 119 The Trial Chamber found that, under the Khmer Rouge, "[i]ndividuals
were married in a widespread climate of fear and the consent purportedly given either
before or during wedding ceremonies did not amount in most cases to genuine consent."120 Additionally, these marriages were followed by forced sexual intercourse
between the new spouses. 121 The two accused were therefore convicted ofthe crime
against humanity of"other inhumane acts" committed through forced marriage and
rape in the context of forced marriage. 122 This judgement therefore became the first
to address forced marriage outside of armed conflict as a violation of international
criminal law. 123
The Sierra Leone and Cambodian circumstances were similar in some ways, but
also very different. 124 In both contexts, forced marriage was an important policy tool
to achieve the goals of the controlling group. 125 As well, forced marriage was carried
out through violence or threats of violence. 126 Additionally, in both countries, the
joining of one person to another took place without traditional rituals or the customary presence of the bride and groom's parents or relatives. 127 On the other hand, in
Sierra Leone the victims were all identified as female and were not married under
Sierra Leonean law, 128 whereas in Cambodia, the victims were both male and female
and were married under Khmer Rouge law. 129 In Sierra Leone, the forced marriages
119

The ECCC's Trial Chamber has only issued a smnmary ofthe judgment At the time of
writing, the full judgment was not yet available. See Summary ofJudgment in Case 002/02,
supra note 11.
120 Id. ~ 40.
121 See id.
122
Id. mr 41, s1, 6o.
123
See ECCC Co-Prosecutors' Closing Brief;, supra note 95, 1 190 (discussing forced marriage within the context ofa coercive environment or climate offear that can exist independently
of armed conflict).
124
See also Jain, supra note 38, at 1025-28; Bridgette A. Toy-Cronin, What is Forced
Marriage? Towards a Definition ofFarcedMarriage as a Crime AgainstHumanity, 19 CoLUM.
J. GENDER&L. 539,544-56,561,587 (2010).
12
' RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 8, W 1348-49; ECCC Closing Order, supra note 18,
216-17.
126
See AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra note 17, ~ 195 (providing the Special Court's
definition of''forced marriage''); RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 8, W1467--68 (discussing
threats and violence); ECCC Closing Order, supra note 18, mf 849-50 (discussing the po-

mr

tential of execution).
127
AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 17, ~ 36 of Partly Dissenting Opinion of Justice
Doherty on Count 7 (Sexual Slavery) and Count 8 ("Forced Marriage''); ECCC Co-Prosecutors'
Closing Brief, supra note 95, W583, 611.
128
Jain, supra note 38, at 1026.
129
See generally Omer Aijazi & Erin Baines, Relationality, Culpability and Consent in
Wartime: Men's Experiences ofFarcedMarriage, 11INT'LJ. TRANsmONALJUST. 463 (2017)
(discussing the issue of male experiences of forced marriage in war).
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occurred during an armed conflict with non-state actors as the perpetrators, 130 while
in Cambodia the state was the perpetrator. 131 In Sierra Leone, forced marriage included forced domestic labor, 132 but in Cambodia, forced labor was not an inherent
part ofthe forced marriage experience--it was part ofthe overarching Khmer Rouge
revolutionary program and forced on virtually all Cambodians. 133 This means that
the Special Court's Taylor Trial Chamber's recharacterization of forced marriage
as conjugal slavery would likely not apply to the Khmer Rouge situation.
The fact that one international criminal law label-forced marriage--can be
applied to two diverse circumstances illustrates the flexibility of the term. However,
this flexibility also indicates that the violation of forced marriage is undertheorized,
given the significant difference between the Special Court's reliance on forced conjugal
(domestic and sexual) labor as an integral part of the definition and the ECCC' s
different emphasis on lack of consent to marriage and rape after marriage. 134

ill. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND FORCED MARRIAGE
As with the 2002 Statute ofthe Special Court and the 2001 Statute ofthe ECCC,
the 1998 Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court (ICC) does not list forced
marriage as a crime against humanity (or any other type of crime). 135 Indeed, the decision to charge forced marriage under the crime against humanity of"other inhumane
acts" at the Special Court for Sierra Leone occurred in 2004, after the adoption of
these Statutes. 136
While the Special Court had already established jurisprudence on forced marriage
by the time the ICC began considering cases with similar fact scenarios, the ICC's
Prosecutor did not initially charge forced marriage; instead, in Prosecutor v. Katanga,
the prosecution charged facts involving forced marriage as sexual slavery. 137 In that
case, the Pre-Trial Chamber linked sexual slavery and forced marriage when observing
130

The individuals prosecuted for forced marriage were from the Revolutionary United
Front and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council rebel groups. See supra Part I.
131
The ECCC Closing Order describes a state of international armed conflict between
Cambodia and Vietnam during the relevant time period. ECCC Closing Order, supra note
18, mf 150--55. However, the imposition afforced marriages throughout the country as part
ofthe socialist revolution was not directly related to that international armed conflict, as evidenced in the description ofthe forced marriage facts at fJ 216--20, which were separate from
the war-related facts at W 150--55.
132
See, e.g., RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 8, mf 1154-55, 1211-12, 1293, 1413, 1472.
133
ECCCClosingOrder,supranote 18, mf3ll, 334,336--37,358,377,390--91,407, 1394.
134
See AFR.C Appeals Judgment, supra note 17, mf 190, 199; Summary of Judgment in
Case 002/02, supra note 11, ~ 40.
m See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 U.N. Doc. NCONF. 183/9 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
136
See AFRC Motion to Amend Indictment, supra note 28, ~ 8.
137
Case No. ICC-0 1/04-01/07, Decision on the Confinnation ofCharges,~ 431, 434-35
(Sept. 30, 2008).
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that "sexual slavery also encompasses situations where women and girls are forced
into 'marriage', domestic servitude or other forced labour involving compulsory sexual
activity, including rape, by their captors."138 While the Pre-Trial Chamber was likely
explaining why it was acceptable to consider evidence of forced marriage under the
sexual slavery charge, this observation harkened back to the Special Court for Sierra
Leone's AFRC Trial Chamber's view that sexual slavery "subsume[s]" forced marriage. 139 The ICC Office ofthe Prosecutor's 2014 Policy Paper on Sexual and GenderBased Crimes does not discuss forced marriage, presumably continuing to consider
forced marriage as falling under sexual slavery at the time the document was released. 140
However, beginning with the case of Prosecutor v. Ongwen, the Office of the
Prosecutor changed direction and charged forced marriage under the same category
of crimes against humanity-"other inhumane acts"---used in the Special Court for
Sierra Leone and the ECCC. 141 Ongwen is a former senior leader and brigade commander of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda. 142 He is charged
with responsibility for a number ofgender-based crimes, including rape, sexual slavery,
forced pregnancy and forced marriage--in fact, his case "currently has the highest
number of counts of sexual and gender-based crimes charges before the ICC. " 143
These charges include direct responsibility for forcing girls and women to serve as
his "wives" and therefore as sexual and domestic slaves. 144 He is also accused of indirect responsibility for forced marriage as part of a common plan "to abduct women
and girls in order for them to serve as forced 'wives', domestic servants and sex slaves
to male LRA fighters. " 145 These "wives" "lived under constant threat of death or severe physical punishment if they failed to respect the exclusivity of the so-called
'marriage' imposed upon them, if they did not submit to sexual intercourse, if they
tried to escape, or if they failed to perform any other duty assigned to them. " 146
At the Confirmation ofCharges stage, the defense argued that the forced marriage
charges are subsumed under the sexual slavery charges, as the conduct for one is the
same as the conduct for the other. 147 Relying on the Special Court for Sierra Leone's
AFRC Appeals Chamber judgment and the ECCC's Closing Order in Case 002, the

Id ~ 431.
See AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 17, ~ 713-14.
140
See International Criminal Court, Office ofthe Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Sexual and
Gender-Based Crimes 'J 34 (2014) (having the opportunity to address forced marriage, but
choosing not to address it).
141
See Ongwen Confirmation of Charges, supra note 1.
138
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See id ~ 3, 54, 58.
WOMEN'S INmATIVES FOR GENDER JUSTICE, GENDER REPoRT CARD ON 1HE INTER.NATIONALCRIMINALCOURT2018,at123(2018).Forahelpfulsummarychartofthesecharges,
see id. at 124.
144
See Ongwen Confirmation of Charges, supra note 1, ~ 102--{)4.
145
Id ~ 137.
146 Id.
147
See id ~ 87--88.
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Ongwen Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that forced marriage may be charged as an
"other inhumane act"v18 It held that forced marriage "differs from the other crimes with
which Dominic Ongwen in charged, and notably from the crime of sexual slavery, in
terms ofconduct, ensuing harm, and protected interests."149 This difference is twofold.
First, forced marriage involves a forced conjugal union which is required to be exclusive: this "element ofexclusivity ... is the characteristic aspect offorced marriage and
is an element which is absent" from sexual slavery. 150 Second, forced marriage differs
from sexual slavery because it involves the imposition of''marriage" on the victim, "i.e.
the imposition, regardless of the will of the victim, of duties that are associated with
marriage, as well as of a social status ofthe perpetrator's 'wife. "'15 1 Importantly, the
Pre-Trial Chamber addressed the issue ofthe term "marriage"-a term that caused difficulties in the Special Court for Sierra Leone's jurisprudence-by stating that: the ''marriage" need not be legal. 152 It recognized international human rights law by concluding
that forced marriage "violates the independently recognised basic right to consensually
marry and establish a family. This basic right is indeed the value (distinct from e.g.,
physical or sexual integrity, or personal liberty) that demands protection ... !'153 In
other words, rather than focusing on whether the ''marriage" in "forced marriage" meets
the requirements of marriage under international law, the Pre-Trial Chamber focused
on what the '1narriage" prevents: a consensual choice to marry another and a decision to establish a family through the consensual choice. This is an implicit rejoinder
to the Special Court for Sierra Leone's Taylor trial judgment, which deemed "forced
marriage" to be a misnomer. 154 The ICC will likely further develop its consideration
of forced marriage in the Ongwen trial judgment, expected in 20 19 or 2020. 155
Forced marriage has been explicitly charged a second time at the ICC in the case
ofProsecutor v. AI Hassan. 156 In that case, Al Hassan is charged with events taking
place in Timbuktu, Mali, in 2012-2013. 157 He is alleged to have served as the de facto
chief of the Islamic police and involved in the work of the Islamic court under AlQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar Dine, which had taken control of
Timbuktu during this time period. 158 The Warrant of Arrest alleges that Al Hassan
See id. mf 89-92.
Id. ~ 92.
15o Id. ~ 93.
151 Id.
152
See id. ("The fact that such 'marriage' is illegal and not recognised by, in this case,
Uganda, is irrelevant''). It appears that the intra-LRA understanding of whether there was a
"marriage" is the crucial fact, as opposed to whether there was marriage under Ugandan law.
153
Id. ~ 94 (footnotes omitted).
154
See Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 20, mf 425, 427.
155
See generally Ongwen Case, INT'LCRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/ugandalongwen
[https://perma.cc/PX2E-YQA2].
156
See Al Hassan Arrest Warrant, supra note 1, ~ 9.
157
See id. ~ 3.
158
See id. mf 5, 7, 8.
148
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played a part in implementing the policy of forced marriages created by AQIM and
Ansar Dine, ''which victimized the female population of Timbuktu and gave rise to
repeated rapes and the sexual enslavement ofwomen and girls."159 Forced marriage has
been charged as the crime against humanity of"other inhumane acts," as was done for
all other forced marriage charges in the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the
ECCC. 160 AI Hassan is also charged with rape, sexual slavery and gender-based persecution. 161 As this case is still at an early stage, with the Confirmation ofCharges hearing scheduled for May 2019, there is no specific jurisprudence yet indicating whether
the AI Hassan Pre-Trial Chamber will follow the approach to forced marriage set out
by the Ongwen Pre-Trial Chamber. 162 The facts in the Warrant ofArrest do not reveal
if there is a forced domestic labor component to the forced marriages, or whether the
ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber will need to adopt an approach closer to that ofthe ECCC. 163
CONCLUSION: DEFINTI10NAL COHERENCE AND DISSONANCE
REGARDING FORCED MARRIAGE
There is no single conceptualization of forced marriage under international
criminal law. Even so, the sparse case law to date indicates that there is some momentum around the Special Court for Sierra Leone Appeals Chamber's definition
of forced marriage, under which:
[A]n accused, by force, threat of force, or coercion, or by taking
advantage of coercive circumstances, causes one or more persons to serve as a conjugal partner, and the perpetrator's acts are
knowingly part of a widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population and amount to the infliction of great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. 164
This definition was referenced by the ECCC and the ICC. 165 This growing-albeit
nascent-coherence provides a basis on which international criminal law can continue
to develop its understanding and theorization of forced marriage.
At the same time, the case law examined in this Article reveals some fluidity in
the definition and content ofthe "forced marriage" label This flexibility can be helpful,
given the diverse and complex range of practices referred to as forced marriage
Id. ~ 9.
See id. ~ 12.
161
See id.
162
See Al Hassan Case, INT'L CRIM. CT., https:/lwww.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-hassan!Pages/de
fault.aspx [https://perma.cc/57:XZ-5ZPY] (displaying the next session date as May 6, 20 19).
163
See generally Al Hassan Arrest Warrant, supra note 1.
164
RUF Appeals Judgment, supra note 64, ~ 736.
165
See ECCC Closing Order, supra note 18,, 1443; Ongwen Confirmation of Charges,
supra note 1, ~ 89.
159
160
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around the world. 166 It may allow future prosecutors applying international criminal
law to charge forced marriage as the crime against humanity of"other inhumane acts"
in scenarios that are different from Sierra Leone, Cambodia and Uganda. It may also
allow prosecutors to better reflect the views of the victims of forced marriage, depending on whether they better identify with another crime category, such as "sexual
slavery" or "enslavement."167
However, the fluidity also reveals that important questions have not yet been
definitively answered. For example, the Special Court's Appeals Chamber uses the
term forced "conjugal partner"; 168 what does "conjugal" mean in this context? Is
forced domestic labor (or other forms of enslavement) an integral part of "conjugal"? If so, then how can this be reconciled with the ECCC's approach? If forced
domestic labor is not integral, then why did the Special Court consider this type of
labor in detail in the RUF case? Finally, what should be done with respect to the
Taylor Trial Chamber's admonition that forced marriage is a misnomer and should
be replaced by "conjugal slavery''?
The tribunals' defmition of"conjugal" is unclear. The Special Court seems to
include sexual intercourse, domestic labor, childcare and child rearing within
conjugality. 169 However, this list does not work for the ECCC, which only examined
forced consummation. 170 The ICC's approach in Ongwen may provide an answer to
the differences noted between the Special Court and the ECCC's approaches to conjugal duties. In Ongwen, the Pre-Trial Chamber identified two central elements of
forced marriage: the imposition of''marriage" and its associated duties on a victim,
and the imposition of required sexual or other exclusivity. 171 The Chamber also set
out a range ofadditional indicators of forced marriage, including "restrictions on the
freedom of movement, repeated sexual abuse, forced pregnancy, [andl]or forced
labour," such as forced domestic duties. 172 This list of elements and indicators show
that both the Special Court and the ECCC's approaches can be reconciled.
Taking a cue from the Taylor Trial Chamber, some have argued that international criminal law should eliminate the use of forced marriage as a charging label. 173
While the Taylor Trial Chamber recommended switching to the use of "conjugal
166

See MARRIAGE BY FORCE?: CONTESTATION OVER CONSENT AND COERCION IN AFRICA

2 (Annie Bunting, Benjamin N. Lawrance & Richard L. Robert eds., 2016).
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Andrea Raab & Siobhan Hobbs, Forced Relationships: Prosecutorial Discretion as a
Pathway to Survivor-Centric Justice, OPINIOJURIS (Sept. 13, 20 18), http://opiniojuris.org/20 18
/09/13/forced-relationships-prosecutorial-discretion-as-a-pathway-to-survivor-centric-justice
[https://perma.cc/R2WQ-H8RD].
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See AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra note 17,11 196.
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See id 1[ 190; RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 8, 1[ 1293.
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See Summary of Judgment in Case 002102, supra note 11, 1[ 40.
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See Ongwen Confirmation of Charges, supra note 1, 1[ 93.
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Id 1[ 92. It is unclear whether the AI Hassan case will adopt similar indicators.
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For example, Zawati proposes ''marital slavery" as an alternative label. See HILMIM.
ZAWATI, FAIR LABELLING AND 1HE DILEMMA OF PROSECUTING GENDER-BASED CRIMES AT
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slavery" as reflecting a combination of sexual and domestic slavery, some are concerned that the reference to "conjugal" will simply add to the confusion or will
compound "patriarchal societal norms and a conservative construction ofa woman's
roles [sic] in society and the home." 174 Others recommend simply defining forced
marriage acts as enslavement, or propose an understanding of forced marriage within
the wider category of forced relationships, accompanied by prosecutorial discretion
as to how to charge the forced relationships (e.g., as sexual slavery, enslavement,
forced marriage, or something else). 175
Given that the term continues to be used within international criminal law, forced
marriage as a label seems to have some legal and factual resonance for prosecutors
and some victims. 176 Charging of the same term under the same crime against humanity heading has created some nominal coherence in the definition. The ICC has
taken steps to answer key questions, such as the meaning of "marriage" in the term
"forced marriage." It has also set out central elements of forced marriage and key
indicators that create room for other scenarios in other countries to fit within the label.
This all represents growth in understanding within international criminal law. However, given the questions raised by the Taylor Trial Chamber and commentators
regarding the interlinkages and overlaps between forced marriage and different types
of enslavement, it cannot yet be said that forced marriage is a settled concept in
international criminal law.
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